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INTRODUCTION
Scholars, politicians, and pundits dominate the discussion of educa-
tion reform with praise for parental choice.' For example, at his inaugu-
ration, New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani stated, "we must
encourage school choice."'2 In a Time Magazine cover story, Robert Sor-
rell, head of a local chapter of the Urban League, asserted, "we need to
I See Anemona Hartocollis, Choice System Helps Schools in East Harlem, N.Y. Tnvfis,
Feb. 24, 1998, at B1.
2 'Let's See if We Can Make the Changes Last': Excerpts From Mayor's Speech, N.Y.
Tmms, Jan. 2, 1998, at B4.
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give parents choices."'3 Even Bill Clinton, as a presidential candidate in
1991 said, "people need to know they can walk away from bad
schools."'4 This rhetoric has consumed the education reform debate in
the United States for the past fifteen years.5
Beyond the rhetoric, however, lies one of the most important pur-
poses of parental choice: improving students' academic performance. 6
This Note addresses the fundamental purpose of parental choice by ques-
tioning to what extent attending a school of choice improves a student's
academic performance on course work and standardized tests. This Note
attempts to answer the question by analyzing the students' academic
records in the New York City school choice programs. Specifically, the
study compares the math and English course scores of students who at-
tended their choice high school and those who were rejected by their
choice high school and attended their local neighborhood school.7 Con-
trary to the rhetoric, the data shows that parental choice does not improve
academic performance.
Part I discusses the significance of education in American society.
Part II describes various types of parental choice systems. Part Im de-
notes the theoretical underpinnings of parental choice programs. Part IV
describes the current legal framework in some states that have adopted
statutory school choice regimes. Part V describes New York City's
school choice program. Part VI sets forth the study's methodological
design. Finally, Part VII enumerates and explains the study's results.
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
One must consider an important question: why do federal, state, and
local governments believe education warrants constant proposals for pa-
rental choice reform? There are at least three prominent reasons for soci-
3 Richard Lacayo, They'll Vouch for That, TImm, Oct. 27, 1997, at 72.
4 Theodore JT. Forstman & Bruce Kovner, How to Energize Education, N.Y. Trams, Jan.
3 1998, at All.
5 See generally MILTON & ROSE F~mDmAN, FREE TO CHOOSE ch. 6 (1980); JOHN E.
CHmB & TmRY M. MOE, POLITCS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); and MYRON
LIEBERmAN, PRIVATIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE (1989) (all three supporting parental
choice); JEFFREY R. HENIG, R=NING SCHOOL CHOICE: LamS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR
(1994); TONY WAGNER, How SCHOOLS CHANGE (1994) (both discussing the limits of parental
choice reform).
6 See Mary Anne Raywid, The Mounting Case For Schools of Choice, in JoB NATHAN,
PUBLIC SCHOOLS By CHOICE 14 (2d. ed. 1993) ("youngsters will perform better and accom-
plish more in learning environments they have chosen than in environments which are simply
assigned to them"); Chester E. Finn, Jr., Why We Need Choice, in WILIAm LowE BOYD &
HERBERT J. WALBERG, CHOICE IN EDUCATION: PoTEN-IAL AND PROBLEMS 4 (1990) ("[s]chools
of choice are more effective educational institutions; that is, students learn more in them.").
7 The study controls for initial student ability upon entering high school by comparing
students of equal ability, as measured by standard reading and math scores assessed in middle
school.
EDUCATIONAL CHOICE
ety's emphasis on education. First, the decline in educational
achievement directly impacts the competitiveness of industry.8 When
"human capital" deteriorates, the labor market in that community suffers
and the community is less attractive to business. 9 Similarly, the rise in
educational achievement increases national wealth and advances techno-
logical development. 10 Second, educational achievement influences the
extent to which individuals participate in democracy." Educated indi-
viduals are more likely to vote and participate in government.12 Third,
educational achievement effects the social fabric of society. For exam-
ple, the more educated an individual is, the less likely that individual will
commit violent crimes. 13 Consequently, educational achievement con-
tributes to the "improve[ment] in social conditions, and [the] reduction
[of] social tensions caused by economic inequalities.' 4
One must ask why does education need reform? An abundance of
bleak statistics illustrate the problem.' 5 In the United States, graduation
rates have decreased, 16 while absenteeism has increased. 17 In urban ar-
eas, half of all fourth and eighth graders fail to reach minimal standards
in reading, mathematics, and science.' 8 In the study, A Nation at Risk:
The Imperative for Educational Reform, an 18-member commission
stated, "[t]he educational foundations of our society are presently being
eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a
8 See Tom Feeney, Why Educational Choice: The Florida Experience, in PPrvATIZ-NG
EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANs, AND ExPERiENc s 52 (Simon Ha-
kim et al. eds., 1994).
9 See generally EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELINE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY AND APPLIATIONS 568-94 (1986); MARTIN BRoNFENBRENNER ET. AL., ECONOMICS
754 (1990) (arguing that for America to regain its competitive edge, it needs a "massive in-
vestment program in human capital-in the education and training of the young people who
will form the work force of the future."); but see DmK H. ALDCROFr, EDUCATION, TRAINING
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 9-12 (1992) (arguing that while in "broad terms one can
demonstrate a systematic relationship between income levels and educational endowment," the
relationship between education and economic growth is "nebulous.").
10 See JOEL SPRING, AMmuCAN EDUCATION 18 (1994).
11 See THoMAs E. PATIERSON, THE AMERICAN DmocRAcY 247 (1993).
12 See i&L
13 See SPRING, supra note 10, at 12-14.
14 Id. at 14.
15 See John Leo, Hey, We're No. 19!, U.S. NEws AmD WORLD REPORT, Mar. 9, 1998, at
14 (citing study of 21 nations which demonstrated that American high school seniors came in
16" in science, 19' in math, and last in physics); Rene Sanchez, U.S. High School Seniors
Rank Near Bottom, WAsHINGTON PosT, Feb. 25, 1998, at Al (citing study of 21 nations show-
ing American students rank near the bottom in both math and science).
16 See CHUa & MoE, supra note 5, at 9.
17 See id.
18 See Ethan Bronner, Report Shows Urban Pupils Fall Far Short in Basic Skills, N.Y.
Tmms, Jan. 8, 1998, at A12.
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nation and a people."'19 Against this backdrop, school reformers called
for parental choice.
I1. TYPES OF PARENTAL CHOICE SYSTEMS
Parental choice is defined in numerous ways. Some define choice
as "empowering parents and students ... to choose between private and
public schools in a market-like arrangement where schools compete for
students."20 Others use a broader definition such as "education systems
in which parents are allowed maximum decision-making authority over
their children's schooling."'21 Regardless of how narrow or broad one's
definition is, parental choice programs generally fall into one of four
models.
The first is the public school choice model, which allows students to
attend public schools within any school district, regardless of the stu-
dents' residence in a particular district.22 The second model provides
both for public and private school choice. In this context, governments
would provide subsidies (i.e., tax credits, vouchers, or direct aid) to pub-
lic schools and students attending private schools.23 The third model is
known as "government-funded privatization." 24 Under this model, "the
public school system is eliminated, and is replaced by state subsidies to
parents, who then select any school of their choice for their children."25
The government might still maintain some control, in terms of quality
control, teacher certification, and other regulations. 26 Finally, the fourth
model is known as "outright privatization." 27 This program eliminates
all public schools and government subsidies to education, leaving parents
to their own resources to pay for schooling.28
19 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, NATION AT RISK 5 (1984).
20 Marilyn V. Yarbrough, School Choice and Racial Balance: Silver Bullet or Poison
Dart?, 2 KAN. L. J. & PuB. POL'Y 25, 26 (1992).
21 Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of Choctaw
County, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 1 (1992).
22 See ELca AlN COiN, MARcnr APPROAcHES TO EDUCATION: VOUcHERS AND SCHOOL
CHOICE 3 (1997).
23 See id.
24 Id. at 4.
25 Id.
26 See id,
27 Id.
28 See id.
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I. PARENTAL CHOICES' THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. THE PROBLEM
Many families move to a particular place because of the quality of
services provided by local government.2 9 The quality of the education
system is often an important factor in this equation.30 For many, how-
ever, the ability to "vote with their feet"' 31 and move to another locality is
expensive. Policy-makers have attempted to design parental choice stat-
utes to solve this problem by providing students access to preferred
schools, regardless of their place of residence.32
B. MARKET THEORY SUPPORTING PARENTAL CHOICE POLICY
Advocates of parental choice usually base their position on free-
market theory.33 Under this theory, education is a private good that is
more efficiently transferred to consumers through a competitive market-
place.34 Consumers of education (students and parents) enter the educa-
tion marketplace to maximize their satisfaction, 35 while suppliers of
education (schools) desire to maximize profits.36 The interaction of the
supply and demand establish the market price of education. 37 Propo-
29 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418 (1956) ("ITihe consumer-voter moves to [the] community whose local government best
satisfies his set of preferences.").
30 See id.
31 ALBERT 0. HRscIImAN, Exrr, VoicE, AND LoYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FumRs, ORrA GmnrONS, AND STATES 16 (1970) (citing MILTON FR EDMAN CAIrrAUSM AND
FREEDOM 91 (1962)):
Parents could express their views about schools directly, by withdrawing their
children from one school and sending them to another, to a much greater extent then
is now possible. In general they can now take this step only by changing their place
of residence. For the rest, they can express their views only through cumbrous polit-
ical channels. Id. (emphasis added).
32 See FRiEDMAN, supra note 5, at 161.
33 See generally Angela G. Smith, Public School Choice and Open Enrollment: Implica-
tionsfor Education, Desegregation, and Equity, 24 J.L. & EDUC. 147, 169 (1995) ("The mar-
ket theory of choice is based on the assumption that market pressures will cause individual
schools to improve or close; the end result in either case being a better school system.").
34 See Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Enter the "Adapt or Die" Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARsHALL
L. Rnv. 77, 80-81 (1995).
35 See MARTN HUGHES ET AL., PARErrs Am THam CHImDREN's SCHooLS 100 (1994)
(maintaining that parents consider many factors to determine their satisfaction with a particular
school including relationships, the staff, the atmosphere, the ethos, good discipline, and wide-
ranging education).
36 See HENIG, supra note 5, at 57.
37 See generally FromD-AN, supra note 5, at 14. Friedman argues that the pricing system
performs three vital functions in the economy: (1) it transmits information; (2) it provides an
incentive to adopt those methods of production that are least costly and thereby use available
resources for the most highly valued purposes; and (3) it determines who gets how much of the
product-the distribution of income. See id.
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nents of parental choice assert that this interaction between supply and
demand yields a more efficient and academically successful education
system. Those who favor making education a private good maintain that
the consumers will be better off because they can "compare prices and
quality and make informed decisions about how best to allocate the
money they have available to spend."38
At the core of the struggle to place education in the free-market is
the belief that the current bureaucratic monopoly over education prevents
innovation, improvement in educational services, and cost reductions. 39
The proponents of parental choice argue that when education is relin-
quished from bureaucratic control and placed in the free-market, this mo-
nopoly will end and improvement in educational achievement will
begin.4° John Chubb and Terry Moe advance three reasons why markets
function to ensure the influential role of parents and students. First, they
emphasize the suppliers (the schools) incentive to please the clientele
(the parents and students).41 Second, they stress parents' ability to
choose among alternatives and the freedom to leave one school if not
satisfied.42 Finally, the authors underscore the notion that schools will
close if they fail to satisfy a large number of parents.43
Further, Chubb and Moe examine what rights and duties education
suppliers and consumers would maintain if society viewed education as a
private good:
Owners of a school have a legal authority to create
whatever kind of school they please, but they cannot re-
quire anyone to attend or finance it. They have authority
over their own property, not over the property of others.
Parents and students have the right to seek out whatever
kinds of schools they like. But they cannot force schools
to adopt specific courses, hire certain teachers, or pursue
certain values. Nor can they force schools to grant them,
admission .... They must be free to admit as many or as
few students as they want, based on whatever criteria
they think relevant-intelligence, interest, motivation,
38 HENIo, supra note 5,at 57.
39 See id The current bureaucratic education system is confusing because:
... through its school funding arrangement, the relationship between prices and
service received, constraining free choice by its mandatory assignment procedures
and its effective monopoly, and limiting competition by imposing regulatory hurdles
that make it difficult for new schools to be formed. Id
40 See William Bennett, Education Reform Through Choice, in K.L. BnU.NGsLEY,
VOICES ON CHOICE: Tim EDUCATION REFoRM DEBATE 54-55 (1994).
41 See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 5, at 32.
42 See id
43 See id
EDUCATIONAL CHOICE
behavior, special needs-and they must be free to exer-
cise their own informal judgments about individual
applicants.44
In short, parental choice proponents advocate the freedom of parents
and students to choose a school, and the freedom of schools to choose
students. The latter poses serious equity problems. As one scholar
stated, "[t]he admissions process is perhaps the area with the greatest
potential for abuse in a deregulated environment, and both the policies
and practices of choice schools in this regard must be subject to strict
statutory guidelines. '45 The potential for abuse of the admissions system
is one of many arguments advocated by parental choice opponents.
C. THEoRIms AND ARGUMENTS OPPOSING PARENTAL CHOICE POLICY
Parental choice opponents fear that placing education into the free-
market will produce a sub-optimal supply of education due to the free-
rider problem.46
Even when people recognize the collective social
benefit that comes from a well-educated population....
all citizens have a self-interest in reducing their own
contribution to the funding of schools, while shifting the
burdens to others.... Citizens who act like rational, self-
interested consumers will figure that they can enjoy ben-
efits of living in a highly educated society even if they
do not pay their own fair share.... Through its taxing
authority, government can demand contributions from
citizens, essentially forcing them to do what is in their
collective best interest.47
Thus, if citizens exercised their own discretion, some families, act-
ing rationally, will under-invest in education, relative to what is good for
society at large. This phenomena is reflected in the way some elderly
44 Id. at 29, 221-23 (emphasis added); see also Albert Shanker and Bella Rosenberg,
Politics, Markets, and Americas Schools: A Rejoinder in INDEPENDENT ScHooLs, INDEPEND-
mr THiNcnns 347 (1992) (concluding that Chubb and Moe's plan "may improve some stu-
dents' chances of having their educational needs and wants fulfilled, but it also would further
reduce other students' chances of doing so.").
45 Stuart Biegel, School Choice Policy and Title VI: Maximizing Equal Access for K-12
Students in a Substantially Deregulated Educational Environment, 46 HASTiNGS L.L, 1533,
1580 (1995).
46 See HENIG, supra note 5, at 61.
47 Id.
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taxpayers vote down local school budgets because they no longer have
children in the public school system.48
Consequently, parental choice opponents maintain that education is
a public or collective good.49 Collective goods are "those that are con-
sumed by the community as a group. Markets typically fail to provide
them in efficient quantities.... The services of schools have important
external and collective aspects, since students from one district often
meet and work with people from other school districts."50 When market
failure occurs, 51 governments may supply collective goods to make sure
consumers do not under-invest in them relative to their value to society
as a whole. For reasons stated earlier, education is one such desired col-
lective good.52 An educated populace serves social functions that benefit
the entire society.5 3 Such benefits affect third parties and are called ex-
ternalities. 54 Externalities involved in education include encouraging
lawful behavior, fostering political stability, and producing income gains
for individuals and society. 55
48 See Paul Robert Kohn, A Pilot Study of the Attitudes of the Elderly Toward Public
Education and Voting on School Referenda 40 (1989) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Cornell Uni-
versity) (on file with the Cornell University Library).
49 See BRONFENRENNER, supra note 9, at 769, 781; HENIG, supra note 5, at 61.
50 BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 9, at 781.
51 Economists define market failure as the lack of initial conditions of market success,
such as "informed consumers, absence of internal economies of scale in production, and ab-
sence of externalities either in production or consumption." MARK BLAUG, AN INTRODUCrnON
TO THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 102 (1970).
52 See supra notes 8 through 14 and accompanying text.
53 See FnmEM~AN, supra note 5, at 86. Milton and Rose Friedman noted that:
mhe gain from the education of a child accrues not only to the child or to his
parents but also to other members of the society. The education of my child contrib-
utes to your welfare by promoting a stable and democratic society. It is not feasible
to identify the particular individuals (or families) benefited and so to charge for the
services rendered. There is therefore a significant "neighborhood effect." Id.
54 See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 9, at G-1 1 (defining externalities as "costs or bene-
fits from the consumption or production of a good or service affecting people other than the
buyer and seller of the good or service").
55 See BLAUG, supra note 51, at 108. The nine common externalities involved in educa-
tion include:
(1) the income gains of persons other than those that have received additional
education, (2) the income gains of subsequent generations from a better educated
present generation, (3) the provision of an efficient mechanism for discovery and
cultivating potential talents, (4) the means of assuring occupational flexibility of the
labor force, (5) the creation of an institutional environment that stimulates research
in science and technology, (6) the encouragement of lawful behavior and the promo-
tion of voluntary responsibility for welfare activities, both of which reduce the de-
mand on social services financed out of taxes, (7) the tendency to foster political
stability by developing an informed electorate and competent political leadership, (8)
the emergence of "social cohesion" by the transmission of a common cultural heri-
tage, and (9) the widening of intellectual horizons of both the educated and the uned-
ucated, contributing to enhanced enjoyment of leisure.
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Furthermore, opponents of parental choice urge that a free market
system of education threatens a public school system that "is the most
valuable social tool [available] to provide a common vision and shared
experience." 56 Horace Mann, the father of public education in the
United States, feared the destructive possibilities of religious, political,
and class discord, and sought a common value system that might under-
gird American republicanism and diversity. He yearned for a public phi-
losophy that emphasizes a sense of community.57 Consequently, public
schools in the United States have sought to foster a common set of val-
ues58 and equality of social, political, and economic opportunity.5 9
Choice opponents assert that such "common education experience cannot
be left to the vagaries of individual or family choice. ''60
Parental choice opponents also reject the proposed market alter-
natives on equality of opportunity grounds. A school's right to reject
students transfers the power to choose from parents to school administra-
tors. In essence, the suppliers are choosing the consumers, not the other
way around. For example, when a consumer purchases a shirt, the store
does not select which consumers will purchase the shirt. If the consumer
will pay the stated price, the store will sell the shirt. In the education
marketplace, however, willingness to pay the stated price for services is
not the only criteria school administrators consider. School administra-
tors do not want just any student, they want students with certain abili-
ties, attitudes, and skills. One commentator noted:
So long as schools have the right to refuse admission to
some students, school choice plans will result in a
"creaming off' of the most talented students, who would
be admitted to "better" schools while other schools were
left to contend with increasing percentages of less aca-
demically able students in their classrooms. 61
The school administrators' right to "cream off' the better students
may force educators to neglect less talented students. 62 Consequently,
56 Ralph J. Flynn, An Educator's Perspective: Anti-Choice, in PROCEEDINoS: THE FouR-
TiENTH CONFERENCE OF THE UNIvERsrry/URBAN ScHooLs NATIONAL TASK FORCE: SCHOOL
CHOICE 50 (Richard M. Bossone & Irwin H. Polishook eds., 1992).
57 See LAWRENCE CRNN, THE Rznutuc AND THE SCHOOL ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE
MEN 8 (1957).
58 This is a very controversial subject deserving of an article in and of itself. See HENRY
M. LE N, THE THEORY OF CHOICE APPLIED TO EDUCATION 6-7 (1989).
59 See id.
60 Id.
61 WAGNER, supra note 5, at 241 (arguing that schools will not "go out of business" no
matter how poor a job they do because less talented students will still need a place to go to
school after the more popular schools are filled to capacity).
62 See id.
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parental choice may yield an even more inequitable education system
than currently exists.63
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Fourteen states have enacted formal parental choice statutes.64 Sur-
prisingly, many of these statutes contain barriers that prevent students
from attending their school of choice. These barriers include, inter alia,
admission criteria and the exclusion of troubled students from the appli-
cant pool, providing school administrators with a sorting mechanism that
stifles educational opportunities for many students.6 5 Delaware, for ex-
ample, recently passed the School District Enrollment Choice Program.66
The state legislature articulated the purpose of the program as follows:
In establishing this program, it is the goal of the General
Assembly to increase access to educational opportunity
for all children throughout the State regardless of where
they may live. It is therefore the intent of the General
Assembly that this chapter be construed broadly to maxi-
mize parental choice in obtaining access to educational
opportunities for their children. 67
In the same breath, the legislature limits parental choice by allowing
each school district to establish "criteria for acceptance or rejection of
applications and setting priorities for acceptances. Such criteria shall be
reasonably related to the nature of the program or school for which the
application is submitted. '68 This broad statutory language provides
school administrators with great discretion in accepting or rejecting stu-
dent applications. For example, if the "nature of the program" involves
63 See Joseph S. Ambler, Who Benefits from Educational Choice? Some Evidence from
Europe, 13 J. PoL'Y ANALYsis AND MGMr. 454 (1994) (finding equality of opportunity suffers
under school choice programs).
64 See MORRISON INsTITUTE, A NATIONAL REVIEW o OPEN ENRoLLmr/CHoicE: DE-
BATES AN DESCRIrTON 32 (July 1993) (defining formal choice programs as "governed by
specific state legislation that detail any of the parameters regarding program participation (e.g.,
reasons for rejecting nonresident student transfers) and prescribe activities such as transporta-
tion and parent information").
65 See id. (citing D. R. Moore & S. Davenport, Cheated Again: School Choice and Stu-
dents at Risk, THE ScaooL ADMISTIRATOR 12 (1989) ("School choice has typically become a
new improved method of student sorting, in which schools pick and choose among students.").
66 See Di. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 401 (1998).
67 Id. (emphasis added).
68 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 405(b) (1998); but see IDAHo CODE § 33-1404 (1997) (stat-
ing that schools may not consider "previous academic achievement, athletic or other extracur-
ricular ability, handicapping conditions, or proficiency in the English language"); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 15-40.3-06 (1997) (stating schools may not consider "previous academic achievement,
participation in extracurricular activities, disabilities, English language proficiency, or previ-
ous disciplinary proceedings").
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academic aptitude, schools can use the admissions process to select the
over-achievers.
Furthermore, the Delaware statute includes restrictions on admis-
sions based on "capacity." The statute states:
A receiving district may disapprove an application be-
cause of lack of capacity in the district. It may also dis-
approve an application for a particular program or school
because of lack of capacity in the program or school.
For purposes of this subsection, "capacity" shall include
but not be limited to such considerations as space, class
size and enrollment restrictions reasonably related to the
nature of the program or school for which the applica-
tion is submitted. 69
Once again, this broad language provides school administrators with
ample opportunity to incorporate a selection bias into the application pro-
cess. For example, the "but not be limited to" language allows school
administrators to interpret "capacity" with the broadest brush.
Colorado provides even broader statutory language, granting school
districts great latitude in setting admissions criteria. The Colorado stat-
ute provides:
(3) Any school district may deny any of its resident
pupils or any nonresident pupils from other school dis-
tricts within the state permission to enroll in particular
programs or schools within such school district only for
any of the following reasons: ...
(c) The pupil does not meet the established eligibility
criteria for participation in a particular program, includ-
ing age requirements, course prerequisites, and required
levels of performance.70
This delegation of authority to school administrators provides ample
opportunity for schools to "cream-off' the better students and leave the
less talented students for less selective, less preferred schools. 71 This is
tantamount to school choice, not parental choice.72 The schools author-
ity to select students translates into a process of school administrators
weighing the admissions choices, not parents and families. One may ar-
69 Id. (emphasis added).
70 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-36-101 (West 1999) (emphasis added).
71 See WAGNER, supra note 5, at 241.
72 Donald Macleod, Bad Exam Results Drove School to Start Selection, GuARDLaN
(London) 6 (Jan. 9, 1996) ('This is a move towards schools selecting pupils and away from
parents choosing schools. Parental choice has always been a fiction. For oversubscribed
schools parental preferences are of little use if a child does not fulfill the admissions criteria.").
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gue that these schools choose students based on merit and, therefore, any
students with ability may choose his or her school preference. Accepting
this argument on its face,73 it proves the problem with parental choice as
currently construed. Parental choice statutes in Delaware and Colorado
discriminate in favor of students with ability. Consequently, the educa-
tion system articulates the message that society values those students
with ability more than students struggling with their academic studies.
The rhetoric of parental choice, however, never articulates this message
or these restrictions to the parents affected by these programs.
In addition to providing systematic advantages to over-achievers,
the Colorado statute disadvantages under-achievers. Under the Colorado
parental choice program, school districts need not comply with the pa-
rental preferences of a child who "has been expelled, or is in the process
of being expelled .... ,74 Such discretion may lead to schools excluding
certain types of students based on the image the school is trying to
portray.75
Parental choice becomes a misnomer, because the statutory frame-
work installs barriers and restrictions that prevent parents from choosing
their school of preference and provides school administrators with ample
power to do the choosing for them. This phenomena is best described by
an audit commission in Great Britain:
In short, the schools that are in demand do not tend to
expand. And in these cases, "choice" is primarily exer-
cised by the schools deciding which pupil they will ac-
cept through the rationing device of the school's
admission policy, rather than by parents deciding which
school their children will attend.76
A random-assignment system, such as the one used in New York
City public high schools, would alleviate many of the statutory barriers
to parental choice.
73 This argument will not always prove correct since over-subscription may trump the
desire of the school to accept all of the meritorious candidates.
74 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-36-101.
75 See Jonathan Robinson, The Law of Education in 1992, NEw L.J. 24 (Jan. 10, 1992)
(citing reports in Great Britain showing that schools are "increasingly excluding children with
behavioral difficulties in order to avoid damaging the schools' image and reputation with
parents").
76 John O'Leary & David Charter, Parents Denied Choice of Schools, TIMEs 1-2 (Dec.
17, 1996).
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V. NEW YORK CITY'S SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS
A. HISTORY OF NEw YORK Crry's SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the New York City public
school system consisted primarily of a zoned or neighborhood school
system where students attended the school designated for their neighbor-
hood by local school districts. 77 As many people joined the labor force
instead of completing high school in the early and middle periods of the
twentieth century, parents did not seek educational choice.78 Rather,
they maintained confidence in their neighborhood school.79
Parental satisfaction with zoned schools declined in the late 1960s.80
Many parents no longer felt safe sending their children to neighborhood
schools as the feeling of pride and confidence in neighborhood schools
deteriorated into fear and insecurity. Consequently, in 1968, New York
City created an experimental program in John Dewey High School.81
Every applicant to the school had to file a special application to attend.82
The school utilized a formula in its admissions process requiring the
school to accept below-average, average, and above-average readers, us-
ing standardized reading exams given in the eighth grade.83
During the 1970s, many high schools adopted choice programs and
New York City built new schools specifically for such programs. 84
When neighborhood schools started to feel pressure to attract students,
they too adopted choice programs to supplement existing programs. 85
The neighborhood schools, however, did not eliminate their zoned pro-
grams. Instead, they established screened programs including "schools
77 Telephone Interview with Lawrence Edwards, Superintendent of High Schools, New
York City Board of Education (Jan. 1995).
78 See id
79 See id Lawrence Edwards stated:
Vocational high schools represent a significant exception because of their popu-
larity among students who seek to learn a specific trade. Four specialized high
schools provide another exception to traditional neighborhood schools: Stuyvesant,
Brooklyn Tech., Bronx High School of Science, and Fiorello H. LaGuardia High
School of the Arts, are among the most prestigious in the City. These schools admit
students based on passing an examination. New York City also had single sex
schools such as Boys and Girls High School. Other than these exceptions, all stu-
dents attended their zoned school. Id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id. The school accepted twenty-five percent of the students from the below-aver-
age reading group, fifty percent from the average reading group, and twenty-five percent from
the above average reading group. See OFrmc oF REsARcii, EVALUATION, Am AssEssMENT
(OREA), NEw YoRK Crry BoARD OF EDUCATION, A LONGrruDiNAL STUDY OF T=E IMPACr OF
EDUCATIONAL OpTIoNs RBviSED ADfISSIONS POLICY 1 1987-91 (1992).
84 Telephone Interview with Lawrence Edwards, supra note 77.
85 See id.
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within schools" to which any student could apply.8 6 In short, within one
building existed two schools: a neighborhood school for local residents
and a choice school for students living within and outside the local
school district.
The experiment with John Dewey High School and the "schools
within schools" programs produced more interest in parental choice. The
Screened and Education Options Programs provided the next step.
B. DESCRIPTION OF EDUCATIONAL OPTIONS PROGRAM
1. General information
On September 17, 1986, the New York City Board of Education
accepted the Chancellor's recommendations regarding the admissions
process for the parent choice program known as "educational options. 87
Educational Options Programs (EOP) now exist in more than one hun-
dred and fifty New York City public high schools.88 Sixty-one are total
EOP schools, while the rest constitute "schools within schools."89 EOP
schools advertise their programs as helping to prepare students for partic-
ular careers, including law, medicine, and business.90 The schools also
require the basic academic courses, thus preparing students for college.91
In October of every year, a high school fair takes place in Manhat-
tan, where parents and students gather information about high schools
and the admissions process.92 In November, students must complete
their applications for high school.93 Every student seeking to attend a
New York City public high school must fill out an application, including
those students who want to attend their local neighborhood schools.94
Students who choose to attend their neighborhood school simply check a
box on the application indicatihg their choice and the process is com-
86 See id. The "school within a school" program focused on a specific career, such as
law, but also required the completion of academic courses for college.
87 Letter from Frank L. Smith, Executive Director, High School Division, New York
City Board of Education to High School Superintendents (Oct. 6, 1986) (on file with author).
88 See OFFICE OF SCHOOL PROGRAMS AND SUPPORT SERVICES, NEw YORK CrrY BOARD
OF EDUCATION, SUPPLEMENTARY HIGH SCHOOL DIRECTORY GUIDE FOR COUNSE.ORS 1998-
1999 (1999).
89 See NEw YORK CrrY BOARD oF EDUCATION, DIRECTORY OF PUBLIC HiGH ScHooLs
58-9 (1994-95).
90 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, AND ASSESSMENr (OREA), supra note 83, at
1.
91 See id.
92 See NEw YoRK CrrY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DIRECTORY OF THE PUBLIC HIGH
SCHOOLS 3 (1998-99).
93 See id.
94 Zoned schools are schools that serve only a particular geographic region. See ROBERT
L. CRAIN, THE ErEaNv ss OF NEw YoRK Crrv's CAREER MAGNET SCHOOLS: AN EVALUA-
TION OF NINTH GRADE PERFORMANCE USING AN EXPE&MENTAL DESIGN 5 (1992).
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pleted.95 A neighborhood school cannot deny admission to a student re-
siding within the school district. 96
Students are not limited to neighborhood schools, as they may apply
to schools outside their district. The application provides students with a
list of the eight prestigious programs in the New York City high school
system.97 Students must pass an examination or audition to gain admis-
sion to these schools. 98 Additionally, the application provides eight
spaces to apply for admission into the EOP or screened programs. Stu-
dents are instructed to list up to eight EOP or screened schools in priority
order, because indicating a high priority increases the chances of admis-
sion.99 Students may gain admission into an EOP school through one of
two methods: random-assignment or school-selection. 100 Students may
attain admission into a screened school only through school-selection. 101
2. Random-assignment
The Board of Education selects half of the new admissions at ran-
dom from those students who identify the EOP school as their first
choice.' 02 Among both the randomly-assigned and school-selected co-
horts, sixteen percent must constitute below-average readers, sixty-eight
percent average readers, and sixteen percent above-average readers.10 3
Students who score within the top two percent on the standardized read-
ing test, however, are automatically accepted to their first choice.1' 4
The Educational Testing Service (ETS)-a private corporation-
administers the admissions process. 0 5 They assign a four-digit number
to every student who applies to a particular program. 10 6 The priority
95 See NEw YORK CrrY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DIRECrORY OF THE PUBUC HIGH
SCHOOLS 9 (1997-98).
96 See U
97 These programs include Bronx High School of Science, Brooklyn Technical High
School, Stuyvesant High School, and the five programs at Fiorello H. LaGuardia High School
of the Arts. See CRAIN, supra note 94, at 5.
98 See NEw YoRK CrrY BOARD OF EDUCATION, STUDENT HANDBOOK FOR THE SPECIAL-
IZED HIGH SCHOOLS 1995-96, 4 (1995).
99 See CRAIN, supra note 94, at 5. In 1994-95, over 90% of the randomly-selected appli-
cants received acceptance into one of their top two choice schools. Telephone interview with
Robert Klein, Director of Admissions, New York City Board of Education (Jan. 1995).
1oo See Letter from Frank L. Smith to High School Superintendents, supra note 87, at 1.
101 This study analyzes the EOP system. Unlike the EOP schools, the screened schools
select one hundred percent of their student body. The EOP schools select fifty percent of their
student body. See NEw YoRK CrrY BOARD OF EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 9.
102 See id
103 See Nw YoRK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, supra note 95, at 12. The schools base
these reading levels on the Degrees of Power standardized reading exam administered in the
middle schools. Id.
104 See id
105 See CRAIN, supra note 94, at 5.
106 See id.
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level designated by the student on his or her application is the first
digit.' 07 The remaining three digits constitute the random numbers used
for selection purposes. 10 Students with the lowest random numbers re-
ceive offers to enroll in their school of choice. 0 9 If a student applies to
eight different EOP schools, he or she will receive eight different random
numbers. 1 o
Each school must provide the Board of Education with information
about the number of spots available for student admissions by filling out
a seat declaration form and sending it to the Board of Education in No-
vember."' Factors a school considers when calculating its seat utiliza-
tion include: (1) the incoming zoned population (only for schools that
have zoned and EOP programs); (2) anticipated "no shows;" (3) "over
the counter" admissions (students who moved into New York City after
the application process and never applied to high school); (4) discharges;
and (5) the student declination rate." 2
Prior to the Board's resolution, random-selection did not exist and
schools selected their entire student body. 113 The Board of Education
instituted random-selection because it feared that an admissions process
using solely school-selection may allow popular schools to choose the
"better" students leaving those who did not meet the school-based crite-
ria with limited or no choices. 114 This "creaming" off of better students
limited the enrollment opportunities for many at-risk students." 5
3. School-selection
After the randomly-assigned cohort is placed into an EOP school by
the computer, the school administrators receive the application of stu-
dents seeking admission who were not placed through the random-as-
signment process. 116 At this point, school administrators may consult the
following items when selecting a student:
107 See a
108 See id.
109 See id
110 See id.
111 Telephone interview with Robert Klein, supra note 99.
112 See id.
113 See OFIMCE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND AssEssMENT (OREA), supra note 83, at
1. The Board did, however, require schools to select twenty-five percent of their students from
the above-average reading level, fifty percent from the average reading level, and twenty-five
percent from the below-average reading level. See id.
114 See HIGH SCHOOL ADMISSION AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF SCHOOLING: A REPORT OF
THE UNIvERsrrY CONSULTANTS 17 (1986).
115 See EDUCATION PRioRrrms PANEL, LOST IN THE LABYRNT: NEw YORK CrrY HIGH
SCHOOL ADMIsSIONS 10 (1985) (finding "many schools have been selecting the 'best' stu-
dents... leaving those who did not do well, to fend for themselves.").
116 See CRAIN, supra note 94, at 6.
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(1) the citywide standardized reading test score attained
in the term preceding application, (2) subject grades
earned in the term preceding application, (3) overall av-
erage in the term preceding application, (4) whole day
absences in the school year preceding application, (5)
half-day absences in the school year preceding applica-
tion, (6) lateness in the school year preceding applica-
tion, and (7) student interest as demonstrated by priority
choice.117
Schools must not consider locally administered tests, interviews, ex-
hibitions, or performances, except for screened programs that concentrate
on areas such as performing arts, fine arts, or design."" The EOP
schools will select those students best meeting the school's selection cri-
teria. If a student is rejected from the randomly-assigned and school-
selection process, the student is guaranteed a place at his or her zoned
school. 119
4. Acceptance into EOP
The Board of Education and individual schools issue acceptances
during the course of three rounds, and each student must make a final
choice by the end of the third round.120 The randomly-assigned and
school-selected students are combined and students are sent acceptance
letters. 121 Students may accept or reject the offers of admission or wait
to hear about admission off two waiting lists. 122 The first waiting list is
constructed randomly by the Educational Testing Service.' 2 3 The school
creates the second waiting list for its own portion of school-selected stu-
dents. 124 The waiting list students fill rounds two and three if round one
did not meet the school's quota. 12
Students do not know whether they fall within the randomly-as-
signed or school selected cohort, nor is the school given the name of
randomly-assigned students. 126 The school could maintain records as to
whom they selected and all the others would constitute the randomly-
assigned group, but it is unlikely that the school would devote resources
to such a project. Consequently, the selection process is anonymous.
117 See Naw YoiRx CrrY BOARD OF EDUCATION, supra note 95, at 12.
118 See Letter from Frank L. Smith to High School Superintendents, supra note 87, at 1.
119 See NEw Yox CrrY BOARD oF EDUCATION, supra note 95, at 9.
120 See CRArN, supra note 94, at 5-6.
121 See id.
122 See iL
123 See EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, HIGH SCHooL ADMISSION SYSTEM 1-2 (1991).
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See CRAIN, supra note 94, at 6.
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Students may appeal their admission to a certain school by sending an
appeal letter to the Division of High Schools. 127
A hypothetical illustration may prove helpful. Assume one hundred
thousand students apply to the New York City public high school system.
Further assume that forty-five thousand students apply to the EOP sys-
tem, fifteen thousand apply to their neighborhood high schools, and forty
thousand apply to screened programs. Of the forty-five thousand appli-
cants to the EOP, thirty-three percent would be randomly-assigned,
thirty-three percent would be school-selected, and fifteen-percent would
be rejected by both methods and would subsequently attend their neigh-
borhood school. 128 Of the thirty-three percent randomly-assigned and
the thirty-three percent school-selected, sixteen percent will be below-
average readers, sixty-eight percent will be average readers, and sixteen
percent will be above-average readers. The remaining nineteen percent
would end up attending private schools or moving out of New York City.
In 1998, 89,566 students applied to New York City high schools,
with 77,066 applying for special programs and 12,500 applying directly
to their zoned high school.129 Students applied to 437,455 EOP pro-
grams, averaging 4.9 school choices per application. 130 In 1998, after the
admissions process ended, randomization and school selection process
rejected 10,815 students who subsequently attended their neighborhood
school. 131 The process, however, accepted 40,685 students. 132
In total, approximately sixty-four thousand students enrolled in New
York City public high schools in 1998.133 This means that 25,566 appli-
cants decided not to enroll in a New York City public high school.' 34
These students may have decided to stay in middle school for another
year, entered private school, or moved to another state or city.
127 See NEw YoRK Crry BoARD OF EDUCATION, supra note 95, at 19.
128 The remaining nineteen percent may have enrolled in private school or left New York
City.
129 See EDUCATIONAL TESTNG SaRVIcE, SPECIAL REPORTS (May 1998). In 1991, 86,200
students applied to New York City high schools, with 73,200 applying for special programs
and thirteen thousand applying directly to their zoned high school. See Ud
130 See id. In 1991, students applied to 370,660 programs, averaging 4.3 per application.
See id.
131 See id. In 1991, after the admissions process ended, the randomization and school
selection process rejected 12,000 students who subsequently attended their neighborhood
school. See id.
132 See id.
133 See id. In 1991, 62,943 students enrolled in New York City public high schools. See
id.
134 See id. In 1991, 23,257 applicants decided not to enroll in a New York City public
high school. See id. In addition, in 1991, 13,009 students attended their zoned school by
choice, while 11,745 randomly-assigned and 8,743 school-selected students decided to attend a
New York City public high school. See id.
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The EOP provides an intricate system that attempts to give students
a choice of high schools. Is the system, however, maximizing student
potential? A brief review of previous studies may shed some light on
this paramount question.
C. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE NEW YORK CrrY EDUCATIONAL
OPIONS PROGRAM
Previous studies on the EOP system focused on educational equal-
ity, parent and student behavior, and standardized test exams. The Office
of Educational Assessment (OEA) of the New York City Board of Edu-
cation studied the class of 1987 entering the EOP system. 135 The study
compared a semester's worth of work of a sample136 of randomly- and
school-selected students. 137 The study asked, "are the randomly assigned
educational option students performing as well as selected educational
option students in their first semester of high school?"' 38 The study's
performance indicators included the total number of credits earned, the
number of credits earned toward high school graduation, and
attendance. 139
The OEA study's results included the following: (1) only thirty-four
percent of the randomly-assigned students maintained mathematical
skills at or above grade level when they entered high school, as com-
pared to almost fifty percent of the school-selected students; 140 (2) the
randomly-assigned students accrued more absences than the school-se-
lected students; 141 (3) on average, the randomly-assigned students re-
ceived about seven-tenths of a credit less than school-selected students
during the fall 1987 semester; 142 and (4) the randomly-assigned students
earned fewer credits toward graduation than the school-selected
students. 143
The OEA study noted that the disparity in the number of credits
earned between both cohorts may derive from differences in credits ob-
135 OFFicE OF EVALUATION AND ASsEssmENT (OEA), NEw YORK CrrY BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION, EDUCATIONAL OPTIONS HIGH SCHOOL ADMISSIONS POLICY STuDY (1988).
136 The sample consisted of 17,236 students, 56 percent of whom were randomly-selected
into their school of choice (9,791), and 43.2 percent of whom were school-selected (7,445).
See id. at 5.
137 See icL
138 See id at 4.
139 See id
140 See id. at 7-8. Over half of the school-selected students were absent five or fewer days
during the semester, as compared with forty-three percent of the randomly-selected students.
See id at 13.
141 See id.
142 See id at 14. About thirty percent of the randomly-selected students received six or
more credits, as compared with more than forty-five percent of the school-selected students.
See id
143 See id at 17.
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tamined prior to entering high school.' 44 Nevertheless, the study asserted
that randomly-assigned students were not performing as well as school-
selected students. 145 What the study does not address, however, is how
the randomly-assigned and school-selected students performed on their
course work-how they performed academically.
The Office of Research, Evaluation, and Assessment (OREA) also
conducted a study of the EOP system.' 46 OREA executed a four-year
longitudinal study of the randomly-assigned and school-selected students
entering EOP schools in the fall of 1987.' 47 One group of subjects en-
tered in the ninth grade and the other in the tenth. The OREA findings
include the following: (1) school-selected students demonstrated better
school completion outcomes than randomly-assigned students;' 48 (2)
school-selected students attained a superior four-year graduation rate
(51.1% for the ninth grade cohort and 45.5% for the tenth grade cohort)
as compared with the four-year graduation rate of the full-high school
class (37.6%);' 49 (3) randomly-assigned students also attained a higher
four-year graduation rate than the full high school class (the 39.8% grad-
uation rate was 2.2% higher than full-high school graduation rate);' 50 (4)
the randomly-assigned students' dropout rate (15.9%) was 3.6% lower
than the full high school class;' 5' (5) the dropout rate of both randomly-
assigned and school-selected students who remained in the EOP system
constituted about half the dropout rate of students who transferred out of
the EOP system;' 52 and (6) randomly-assigned students progressed
through high school at a slower rate than school-selected students.' 53
Both the OEA and OREA reports argue that the EOP system de-
creases the dropout rate and provides opportunities for at-risk students.
Some problems exist, however, with these studies' methodology. For
example, the OREA report did not control for pre-existing differences
between the randomly and school-selected cohorts. Consequently, the
disparity in results could derive from pre-existing differences in ability
level and not as a result of the EOP choice system. In addition, one may
use a more accurate measure of academic achievement than absences,
144 See idL
145 See id. at 18-19.
146 See OFicE OF RsEARcH, EVALUAT[ON, AND AsaSsMENT, supra note 83.
147 See id.
148 See id For the ninth grade entrants both groups performed better than the city wide
average, showing higher graduation rates and lower dropout rates than the full high school
cohort.
149 See id
150 See id.
15, See id.
152 See id. at vi.
153 See id. (Accruing credits at a slower rate than school-selected students, randomly-
assigned students fall slightly behind in advancing toward graduation.).
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tardiness, and dropout rates. This study attempts to fill these gaps in
methodology and measurement to better understand the impact of educa-
tional choice on New York City public schools.
VI. METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
This study poses the following question: do students who receive
their choice high school perform better academically because they re-
ceived their choice high school? As stated earlier, one of the most im-
portant purposes of parental choice is to improve students' academic
performance. Credit hours earned toward graduation and absences sim-
ply are not adequate measures of any school choice program's effective-
ness. One must also know how students performed in courses and on
standardized exams.
To test the significance of educational choice, one must operational-
ize his or her observations. 154 Some experts believe that: "The problem
is that you can't directly observe concepts in the real world-they are
abstractions. Therefore, the concepts must be operationalized-defined
in terms that can be measured."'155 To operationalize the concept of aca-
demic performance, this study uses three sequential math courses and
five English courses (the dependent variables).
This study reviewed eleventh grade transcripts of 1150 students
who entered a New York City public high school in 1991-92. The Office
of Automated Admissions randomly selected these 1150 transcripts. The
study contains three cohorts: 412 randomly-assigned students, 440
school-selected students, and 298 students who were rejected by the ran-
domly-assigned and school selection process and therefore attended their
neighborhood high school (the independent variables). The transcripts
contain data156 from the first two-and-a-half years of high school for the
entering class of 1991-92.
The study measures the academic performance of the 1150 students
in English 1 through English 5 and Sequential Math I through Sequential
Math 3.157 Students may take other English or math courses, but the
aforementioned are the standard courses for eleventh grade students. In
addition, the study analyzes the Sequential Math 1 and 2 standardized
Regents exam.158
154 Operational definitions are sets of observations that represent abstract concepts. See
ARTHm W. BDDLE & KNm M. HOLLAND, WmrIER'S GUmE: POLTCAL ScMNce 103
(1987).
155 See id.
156 This data includes their course grades, sequential math Regents exams, whether the
students enrolled in honors or advanced placement courses, absences, and tardiness.
157 By the end of two-and-a-half years of high school study, students should have taken
these courses.
158 The Department of Education determined that:
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Without controlling for initial student ability, this study would say
little about EOP's effectiveness. Consequently, this study uses a pre-test!
post-test control group.159 All three cohorts are given a pre-test to estab-
lish a base of student ability. The standardized reading and math scores
taken during middle school constitute the pre-test. This helps isolate ed-
ucational choice as an influence on academic performance. For example,
if three different students have the same standardized reading and math
scores and they are each from the three different cohorts, one can see
how well each performed under the three different conditions. The ran-
domly-assigned and school-selected cohorts constitute two types of treat-
ment groups and the zoned cohort represents the control group. After the
treatment (the EOP admissions process) is completed, all three groups
are given a post-test consisting of the eight courses-five English and
three math.
Family background, socioeconomic status, and student ability may
all affect the differences between the cohorts. These factors, however,
are controlled by the pre-test. In fact, any alternative hypothesis must
explain events after the pre-test because the pre-test is assumed to reflect
the aforementioned factors on academic performance. This study's de-
sign, however, may pose a problem of mortality. Experimental mortality
"results from a differential loss of subjects from comparison groups over
the course of the experiment."'160 For example, several students in the
zoned cohort may start in English 1 and not get to English 5. To control
for this attrition, the study examines academic progress. To conclude
that one cohort is out-performing another cohort if there is forty percent
less students in the academically successful cohort would constitute a
significant fallacy. Consequently, this study controls for the academic
progress and performance of students in all three cohorts.
Recall that the standardized reading exams play a central role in
EOP's selection process. The randomly-assigned and school-selected
cohorts must contain sixteen percent below-average readers, sixty-eight
Regents exams are achievement tests based on state course of study used in
secondary schools. Prepared by teacher examination committees and Department
subject and testing specialists, [the Regents exams] provide schools with a basis for
evaluating the quality of the instruction and learning that have taken place. They are
used by school personnel to identify major learning goals, offering both teachers and
pupils a guide to important understandings, skills, and concepts. The examinations
also provide pupils, parents, counselors, administrators, college admissions officers,
and employers with objective and easily understood achievement information for use
in making sound educational and vocational decisions.
NEw YoRK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMeN, REsGENs EXAMINATIONS, REGENTS CoMEn-
TENcY TESTs, & PRoyucIENCY EXAMINATION: SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR'S MANUAL I (Jan.
1990).
159 See Lawrence P. Clark, Designs for Evaluating Social Programs, in LEARNING PACK-
AGES IN THE POLICY SCIENCEs 17 (1987).
160 See id.
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percent average readers, and sixteen percent above-average readers based
on the Degrees of Power Reading test.161 Table 1 lists the raw scores
needed on the DRP test to constitute a below-average, average, or above-
average reader.
TABLE 1
RAW READING SCORES AND CORRESPONDING PERCENTAGE
GROUP ON DRP EXAM FOR 1991
Raw Reading Score Percentage Group
Below 37 Bottom 16%
37-65 Middle 68%
Above 65 Top 16%
73 or Above Top 2%
Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical relationship between ability and
performance for each cohort. School administrators are required to se-
lect students within three different groups of ability levels. The study
assumes that the school administrators will tend to select those students
at the top of each group. The diagonal line represents a hypothetical
relationship between ability and performance with a Z, R, and S placed
on the line for zoned, randomly-assigned, and school-selected
respectively.
Figure 2 represents the school-selection bias given the same ability
level. Since school administrators have access to records, such as ab-
sences, tardiness, and DRP and MAT scores, they will use this informa-
tion to select students. Thus, if two students have a sixty-five on the
DRP exam, but one is rarely absent and the other has many absences, the
school administrators will likely choose the person with the fewest ab-
sences and good ability, what this study terms "over-achievers." Figure
2 shows that at any given reading level-30, 60, or 90-one can expect
the school-selected students to perform better, on average, in English
161 See NEw YORK Crry BOARD OF EDUCATION, supra note 92, at 12. New York City
introduced the Degrees of Power Reading (DPR) test in 1986 for grades three through twelve.
The DRP serves the following functions:
(1) The DRP is used to measure students' reading ability and to analyze the
difficulty of reading material, such as textbooks, novels, or newspapers.
(2) The test gauges how well students understand a series of passages that are
progressively more difficult. Each DRP test consists of a series of passages - 11
passages in all - each approximately 300 words long, on a variety of subjects. In
each passage, seven sentences have a missing word. Students are asked to select the
word that belongs in the sentence from a list of five choices.
(3) The test is designed so thai students must understand the whole passage in
order to choose the correct response.
M; see OrFFIC OF EDUCATIONAL AssassmET (OEA), NEw YORK Crry BOARD OF EDUCA-
TIoN, Tim D.R.P. TEST AND TEACHING TOOL BuL.Lmm 1-2 (May 1987).
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courses than the randomly-assigned students and the randomly-assigned
students to perform better, on average, than the zoned students.
Taking into account both the differences in ability and the school-
selection bias, Figure 3 graphically states this studies hypothesis regard-
ing how the zoned, randomly-assigned, and school-selected students will
perform if educational choice is making a difference on academic per-
formance. For educational choice to have an impact on academic per-
formance, the difference between the zoned and randomly-assigned
students must prove greater than the difference between the randomly-
assigned and school-selected students. If this is not the case, and the
difference between the school-selected and randomly-assigned students
is greater than the difference between the randomly-assigned and zoned
students, then it is probably the school administrators skill in selecting
"over-achievers" producing the difference in performance. The next sec-
tion provides the answer to this proposition.
FIGURE 1
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VII. RESULTS
A. ACADEMIC PROGRESS
To determine whether educational choice fosters academic excel-
lence, this study measures academic excellence using two distinct cate-
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gories. First, academic progress is defined as attending a course in a
timely manner, that is, taking a course at or before the expected time.
Second, academic performance is defined as grades on course work and
standardized exams given the same initial ability. If choice has an effect
on academic excellence, students who receive their choice high school
will progress in a more timely manner and perform better on course
work.
Table 2 states the number of students contained in the study at each
grade level for each cohort.162 Student attrition from ninth to tenth and
tenth to eleventh grade could derive from drop-outs, student relocation,
or enrollment in private schools. Table 2 serves as the basis for comput-
ing the percentages of students attending different courses.
162 One may question why there is a disparity between the number of zoned students
relative to the number of randomly and school-selected students? When the Board of Educa-
tion generated the transcripts for each cohort, it could not simply ask the computer for tran-
scripts of the zoned students rejected from the randomly and school-selected admissions
process. The Board of Education asked for the students who did not receive any choice. This
number could include students who enrolled in private school, moved to another location, or
remained in middle school. Consequently, roughly one hundred fifteen students generated for
the zoned cohort consisted of students who did not actually attend a New York City public
high school. This same problem is not present for the randomly-assigned and school-selected
cohort because the Board of Education could ask the computer for transcripts of students who
were randomly-assigned or school-selected.
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Table 3 reports the average scores on both pre-tests: the DRP read-
ing exam and MAT math exam. The mean scores on the DRP exam
follows the pattern of the school-selected students out-performing both
TABLE 2
THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS AT EACH GRADE-LEVEL
Zoned Randomly- School-Selected
Time Period Students Assigned Students Students
9f" Grade 287 407 435
10" Grade 280 382 426
1 Grade 230 329 391
the randomly-assigned and zoned students and the randomly-assigned
students out-performing the zoned students. The MAT scores, on the
other hand, show that the zoned students actually out-performed the ran-
domly-assigned students, while the school-selected students out-per-
formed both groups.
EDUCATIONAL CHOICE
TABLE 3
MEAN SCORES ON PRE-TESTS
Cohort Count Pre-test Mean
Zoned Students 268 DRP 49.3
Zoned Students 260 MAT 62.1
Randomly-Assigned Students 370 DRP 51.5
Randomly-Assigned Students 378 MAT 61.5
School-Selected Students 393 DRP 53.3
School-Selected Students 407 MAT 68.5
Table 4163 depicts the percentage of students who attended math and
English courses and Table 5164 shows the percentages of students who
took these courses in a timely manner. These tables show that, on aver-
age, a larger percentage of school-selected students progress in math and
English than both the randomly-assigned and zoned students. There is
little difference, however, in the progress between randomly-assigned
and zoned students.
The central point elicited from Table 4 is that the difference in aca-
demic progress between the randomly-assigned and zoned students is
less than the difference between the randomly-assigned and school-se-
lected students. The average margin of difference in math courses be-
tween the school-selected and zoned cohort is 14.8% and in English
courses is 5.8%. The average margin of difference in math courses be-
tween the randomly-assigned and school-selected students is 12% and in
English courses is 3.5%. The average margin of difference between the
randomly-assigned and zoned students in math courses is 3.0% and in
English courses is 2.2%. Thus, on average the school-selected students
progress well through English and math courses. On the other hand, lit-
tle difference exists between the academic progress of randomly-assigned
and zoned students.
Table 5 addresses the question of which cohort progresses in a
timely manner, defined as taking a course on or ahead of schedule. 165
Once again, the school-selected cohort contained a larger percentage of
students attending math and English courses in a timely manner.
On average, the school-selected students out-performed the zoned
students by 8.8% in math and 7.2% in English, regarding attending
163 Table 4 includes the percentages of students who first entered the EOP system in ninth
grade and attended the eight courses analyzed in this study.
164 In Table 5, the percentages of students taking courses in a timely manner, is based on
the number of students in tenth grade for Sequential Math 2, English 3, and English 4 and
based on the number of students in eleventh grade for Sequential Math 3 and English 5.
165 Students meet this criteria if they take Sequential Math 1, English 1, and English 2
during or before ninth grade; Sequential Math 2, English 3, and English 4 during or before
tenth grade; and Sequential Math 3 and English 5 during or before eleventh grade.
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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS WHO ATTENDED SEQUENTIAL
MATH AND ENGLISH COURSES
Randomly- School-Selected
Course Zoned Students Assigned Students Students
Sequential Math 1 59.2 69.0 77.9
Sequential Math 2 32.8 34.9 50.0
Sequential Math 3 18.1 15.0 26.7
English 1 92.1 91.0 89.2
English 2 83.3 91.0 92.0
English 3 73.9 75.2 82.5
English 4 63.8 65.6 72.4
English 5 52.6 54.1 58.4
courses in a timely manner. The school-selected out-perform the ran-
domly-assigned students by an average of 10.1% in math and 4.8% in
English, also regarding attending courses in a timely manner. When
comparing the randomly-assigned and zoned students, however, the
zoned students out-performed the randomly-assigned students by a small
average of 1.3% in math, but the randomly-assigned students exceeded
the zoned students in English by 2.3%. The data in Table 5 essentially
follows the pattern in Table 4, in that the school-selected students pro-
gress much faster than both the randomly-assigned and zoned students,
but the randomly-assigned and zoned students show little difference in
their academic progression.
Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 address the issue of academic progress when
one controls for the students' ability.166 The tables report the probability
of a student in each cohort taking a course in a timely manner given the
same ability. The estimated probability is calculated by multiplying the
slope with the reading or math pre-test scores and adding the intercept.
Once again, the data indicates that there is no consistent evidence
demonstrating that choice is having an effect on academic progress. Ta-
ble 6 shows that at a MAT score of seventy-five, the zoned and ran-
domly-assigned students are essentially equivalent in progressing to
Sequential Math 1 and with MAT scores of ninety and 105, the zoned
students maintain a higher probability of progressing to Sequential Math
1 than randomly-assigned students. The same results hold true for Se-
quential Math 2 and 3.
166 The MAT and DRP scores are broken down differently because the performance
measures on the exams differ. For example, a sixty on the DRP exam is equivalent to a
seventy-five on the MAT exam. Scores of 30, 75, and 105 on the MAT exam are considered
low, average, and high respectively. DRP scores of 20, 60, and 80 are considered low, aver-
age, and high respectively.
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS WHO ATTENDED SEQUENTIAL
MATH AND ENGLISH ON OR AHEAD OF SCHEDULE*
Course
Sqtl 1 total
Ahead
On time
Sqfl 2 total
Ahead
On time
Sqtl 3 total
Ahead
On time
English 1
Ahead
On time
English 2
Ahead
On time
English 3
Ahead
On time
English 4
Ahead
On time
English 5
Ahead
On time
Zoned
31.7
11.8
19.9
25.1
12.2
13.2
18.1
10.5
9.6
82.6
23.7
58.9
70.4
22.3
48.1
66.2
21.3
46.1
61.0
18.1
43.9
52.6
14.3
46.6
* Ahead of time means taking Sequential 1 in eighth grade, taking Sequential 2 in eighth or
ninth grade, taking sequential 3 in 8', 9', or 10' grades. Ahead of time in English 1 and
English 2 means taking the courses in eighth grade, taking English 3 and English 4 in eighth or
ninth grades, and English 5 in 8"', 9, or I0"' grade.
* On time means taking Sequential 1 in ninth grade, Sequential 2 in tenth grade, Sequential 3
in eleventh grade, English 1 and English 2 in ninth grade, English 3 and English 4 in tenth
grade, and English 5 in eleventh grade.
Table 7 reports the probability of taking Sequential Math 2 in a
timely manner, given the student has taken Sequential Math 1 in a timely
manner. The probability that randomly-assigned and zoned students pro-
gress to Sequential Math 2 is either identical or the zoned students are
more likely to attend the course. The school-selected students have a
higher probability of attending Sequential Math 2 than both the ran-
domly-assigned and zoned students given the same initial math ability.
Table 8 reports the probability of taking Sequential Math 3 in a
timely manner given the student has taken Sequential Math 2 in a timely
manner. This table also demonstrates that choice played no role in
greater academic progress.
Table 9 yields similar results about the probability of progressing in
a timely manner in English courses. In English 1 students with DRP
Randomly-Assigned
35.1
9.3
25.8
20.9
7.1
14.7
15.0
5.9
10.9
83.3
23.1
60.2
79.1
23.6
60.7
67.1
20.9
49.2
60.9
17.4
46.3
54.1
14.7
48.0
School-Selected
43.2
15.6
27.6
31.3
11.0
20.7
26.7
10.6
17.9
84.8
23.2
61.6
81.8
25.1
56.8
74.3
21.6
53.8
69.4
21.9
50.1
58.4
18.2
44.5
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scores of twenty and forty show that choice made a difference because
the difference in probabilities of progression in the course between the
randomly and school-selected students is smaller than the difference be-
tween the randomly-selected and zoned students. This pattern does not
exist for students with DRP scores of sixty and eighty, where the zoned
students maintained a higher probability of progression than the ran-
domly-assigned students. In short, the data shows no consistent evidence
of educational choice improving academic progression.
TABLE 6
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING SEQUENTIAL MATH 1 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
EQUIVALENT MAT SCORES
Estimated Probability of Taking
Sequential Math 1 for MAT
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned (N=252) -. 55 .014* .38 0' .29 .50 .71 .92
Randomly-Assigned
(N=374) -. 47 .013* .24 0' .31 .51 .70 .90
School-Selected
(N=402) -. 50 .014* .24 0' .34 .55 .76 .97
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
Estimated at or below zero probability.
TABLE 7
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING SEQUENTIAL MATH 2 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
EQUIVALENT MAT SCORES
Estimated Probability of Taking
Sequential Math 2 for MAT
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned (N=248) -. 63 .014* .44 0' .21 .42 .63 .84
Randomly-Assigned
(N=352) -. 51 .011* .24 0' .15 .32 .48 .65
School-Selected
(N=394) -. 68 .015* .30 0' .22 .45 .67 .90
* Statistically Significant at p. 05.
'Estimated at or below zero probability.
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TABLE 8
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING SEQUENTIAL MATH 3 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
EQUIVALENT MAT SCORES
Estimated Probability of Taking
Sequential Math 3 for MAT
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned (N=204) -. 58 .013* .41 0' .20 .40 .59 .79
Randomly-Assigned
(N=300) -. 51 .011* .26 0' .15 .32 .48 .65
School-Selected
(N=361) -. 70 .014* .30 0' .14 .35 .56 .77
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
Estimated at or below zero probability.
TABLE 8 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING SEQUENTIAL MATH 2 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
THE STUDENTS HAS TAKEN SEQUENTIAL MATH 1 IN A
TIMELY MANNER
Estimated Probability of Taking
Sequential Math 2 for MAT
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned (N=79) -. 46 .014* .28 0' .38 .59 .80 1.0
Randomly-Assigned
(N=120) -. 39 0.13* .16 0' .39 .59 .78 .98
School-Selected
(N=169) -. 42 .014* .22 0' .42 .63 .84 1.1
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
Estimated at or below zero probability.
TABLE 8 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING SEQUENTIAL MATH 3 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
THE STUDENT HAS TAKEN SEQUENTIAL MATH 2 IN A
TIMELY MANNER
Estimated Probability of Taking
Sequential Math 3 for MAT
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned (N=59) -. 23 .011* .13 .10 .43 .60 .76 .93
Randomly-Assigned
(N=70) -. 55 .016* .22 0' .41 .65 .89 1.1
School-Selected
(N=123) -. 07 .011* .13 .26 .59 .76 .92 1.1
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
Estimated at or below zero probability.
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TABLE 9
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING ENGLISH 1 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
EQUIVALENT DRP SCORES
Estimated Probability of
Taking English 1 for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 20 40 60 80
Zoned (N=261) .49 .0069* .08 .63 .77 .90 1.00
Randomly-Assigned
(N=365) .66 .0040* .02 .74 .82 .90 .98
School-Selected
(N=388) .69 .0036* .02 .76 .83 .91 .98
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
TABLE 9 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING ENGLISH 2 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
EQUIVALENT DRP SCORES
Estimated Probability of
Taking English 2 for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 20 40 60 80
Zoned (N=261) .19 .011* .13 .41 .63 .85 1.10
Randomly-Assigned
(N=365) .48 .0064* .04 .61 .74 .86 .99
School-Selected
(N=388) .65 .0035* .01 .72 .79 .86 .93
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
TABLE 9 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING ENGLISH 3 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
EQUIVALENT DRP SCORES
Estimated Probability of
Taking English 3 for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 20 40 60 80
Zoned (N=256) .21 .0094* .09 .40 .59 .77 .96
Randomly-Assigned
(N=344) .21 .0093* .06 .40 .58 .77 .95
School-Selected
(N=381) .41 .0064* .04 .54 .67 .79 .92
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
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TABLE 9 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING ENGLISH 4 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
EQUIVALENT DRP SCORES
Estimated Probability of
Taking English 4 for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 20 40 60 80
Zoned (N=256) .27 .0075* .05 .42 .57 .72 .87
Randomly-Assigned
(N=344) .48 .0033 .01 .55 .61 .69 .74
School-Selected
(N=381) .31 .0072* .04 .45 .60 .74 .89
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
TABLE 9 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
TAKING ENGLISH 5 IN A TIMELY MANNER GIVEN
EQUIVALENT DRP SCORES
Estimated Probability of
Taking English 5 for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores 20 40 60 80
Zoned (N=209) .31 .0063* .04 .44 .56 .69 .81
Randomly-Assigned
(N=294) .50 .0032 .01 .56 .63 .69 .76
School-Selected
(N=347) .25 .0070* .03 .39 .53 .67 .81
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
B. ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Table 10 and 11 report the regression statistics for academic per-
formance in math and English courses, controlling for student ability in
math and reading. The estimated class performance is calculated by mul-
tiplying the slope with the reading or math pre-test scores and adding the
intercept. If educational choice improves academic performance, the
school-selected students will out-perform both the randomly-assigned
and zoned students and the randomly-assigned students will out-perform
the zoned students. Note that eighth grade performance occurs prior to
the "treatment" of educational choice. In addition, the regressions for
students taking the course on-time are in bold print because the majority
of students are taking the course during this time period.
Table 10 portrays student performance on all three math courses.
The statistics show no evidence that educational choice played a role in
academic performance for Sequential Math 1. For below-average math
students, with MAT scores of thirty in ninth grade, the zoned students
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out-performed the randomly-assigned students by four points and the
school-selected students by eight points. With a MAT score of sixty, the
zoned students continued to out-perform the randomly-assigned students
by a margin of three points and the school-selected by one point. For the
average math student, the zoned students out-performed the randomly-
assigned students by three points, but the school-selected out-performed
the zoned by two points. With a MAT score of ninety, once again, the
zoned students out-performed the randomly-assigned students, and the
school-selected students out-performed the zoned students. Lastly, for
above-average math students, the zoned students continued to out-per-
form the randomly-assigned students, with the school-selected students
out-performing the zoned students.
When comparing the randomly-assigned and school-selected stu-
dents, except for the below-average math students, the school-selected
students out-performed the randomly-assigned students. For MAT
scores of 60, 75, 90, and 105, the marginal difference between the ran-
domly-assigned and school-selected is 2, 5, 8, and 11 respectively. The
central point is that those not receiving their choice high school-the
zoned students-actually out-perform those who did, the randomly-as-
signed. Consequently, the Sequential Math 1 results yield no evidence
that educational choice is improving academic performance.
Turning to Sequential Math 2, there is also little evidence that edu-
cational choice is translating into higher academic performance. For be-
low-average math students, the zoned students out-performed the
randomly-assigned and school-selected students by two and three points
respectively. With a MAT score of sixty, the course grades are roughly
the same for all three cohorts. For average math students, the zoned and
randomly-assigned cohorts had the same performance with a score of
seventy, and the school-selected achieved a seventy-four. With a MAT
score of ninety, the difference in class performance between the ran-
domly-assigned and school-selected students is greater than the differ-
ence between the randomly-assigned and zoned students. As stated in
the methodology and design section, this pattern demonstrates that there
is very little difference in academic performance between those students
receiving a choice high school and those not receiving one. The school-
selected students' performance may be caused by other factors, such as
those considered by school administrators when selecting the students.
As with Sequential Math 1 and 2, Sequential Math 3 shows no con-
sistent pattern indicating that educational choice plays a role in academic
performance. For math students with MAT scores of thirty and sixty, the
zoned students out-performed both the randomly-assigned and school-
selected students. For average math students, the zoned students contin-
ued to out-perform the randomly-selected students. With a MAT score
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of ninety, the school-selected, randomly-assigned, and zoned students re-
ceived scores of 70, 77, and 68 respectively, but this pattern is the excep-
tion, not the rule. Consequently, educational choice has had little or no
influence on sequential math performance.
Table 11 reports the academic performance statistics for English 1
through English 5. The data on English 1 shows the pattern favoring
educational choice: school-selected students out-performed both the ran-
domly-assigned and zoned students, the randomly-assigned students out-
performed the zoned students, and the difference between the randomly-
assigned and zoned students exceeded the difference between the ran-
domly-assigned and school-selected students. English 2 performance,
however, presents a different pattern. For example, at DRP scores of
sixty and eighty, school-selected and zoned students maintained a higher
English 2 score than randomly-assigned students. At a DRP score of
forty, the randomly-assigned and zoned students have equivalent per-
formance in English 2. At all reading levels, the school-selected students
out-performed the randomly-assigned and zoned students. For English 3,
there is relatively no difference in the performance of the randomly-as-
signed and zoned students. The same pattern holds true for English 4
and 5. Consequently, educational choice had little or no influence on
academic performance in English courses.
TABLE 10
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN SEQUENTIAL MATH 1 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-
LEVEL WHEN COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class Performance
for MAT Scores of
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned 8' (N=26) 38 .47* .14 52 66 73 80 87
90' (N=52) 42 .40* .24 54 66 72 78 84
10' (N=31) 50 .26 .06 58 66 70 73 77
11-' (N=22) 56 .18 .015 61 67 70 72 75
Randomly-Assigned
8- (N=33) 45 .44* .38 58 71 78 85 . 91
9'h (N=93) 38 .41* .23 50 63 69 75 81
101h (N=40) 57 .13 .02 61 65 67 69 71
11- (N=29) 51 .26 .08 59 67 71 74 78
School-Selected
8th (N=64) 55 .34* .24 65 75 81 86 91
9"h (N=105) 28 .61* .35 46 65 74 83 92
10' (N=34) 51 .28* .12 59 68 72 76 80
11t ' (N=21) 53 .18 .06 48 42 40 37 34
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
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TABLE 10 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN SEQUENTIAL MATH 2 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-
LEVEL WHEN COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class Performance for
MAT Scores of
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned 8b (N=7) 37 .54* .57 53 69 78 86 94
9- (N=13) 62 .19 .04 68 73 76 79 82
10'h (N=33) 50 .27* .12 58 66 70 74 78
Ilt(N=17) 54 .16 .04 59 "64 66 68 71
Randomly-Assigned
9th (N=15) 15 .74* .50 37 59 71 - 82 93
10t (N-=42) 46 .32* .10 56 65 70 75 80
11- (N=35) 56 .16 .03 61 66 68 70 73
School-Selected
81 (N=6) 97 -. 18 .06 92 86 84 81 78
9- (N=33) 32 .55* .42 49 65 73 82 90
10- (N=60) 42 .42* .19 55 67 74 80 86
11- (N=54) 60 .73 .01 82 104 115 126 137
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
TABLE 10 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN SEQUENTIAL MATH 3 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-
LEVEL WHEN COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class Performance
for MAT Scores of
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned 9 ' (N=7) -6.1 .85* .54 19 45 58 70 83
10- (N=9) 33 .51 .21 48 64 71 79 87
11th (N=21) 87 -.21 .03 81 74 71 68 65
Randomly-Assigned
10 th (N=11) 9 .82* .47 34 58 71 83 85
1 1 th (N=26) 31 .51* .23 46 62 69 77 85
School-Selected
9- (N=5) 80 -. 14 .00 76 72 70 67 65
10 h (N=29) 49 .34 .09 59 69 75 80 85
11- (N=57) 56 .25* .25* 64 71 75 79 82
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
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TABLE 10 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN SEQUENTIAL MATH 3 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-
LEVEL WHEN COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class Performance
for MAT Scores of
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned 9' (N=7) -6.1 .85* .54 19 45 58 70 83
10t (N=9) 33 .21 .21 48 64 71 79 87
11"' (N=21) 87 -.21 .03 81 74 71 68 65
Randomly-Assigned
101h (N=11) 9 .82* .47 34 58 71 83 85
11- (N=26) 31 .51* .23 46 62 69 77 85
School-Selected
9t (N=5) 80 -. 14 .00 76 72 70 67 65
10' (N=29) 49 .34 .09 69 69 75 80 85
11-' (N=57) 56 .25* .25* 71 71 75 79 82
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
TABLE 11
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN ENGLISH 1 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-LEVEL WHEN
COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class
Performance for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores of 20 40 60 80
Zoned 8' (N=59) 63 .25* .09 68 73 78 83
9- (N=147) 55 .24* .06 60 65 69 74
10"' (N=7) 97 -1.15" .60 74 51 28 05
Randomly-Assigned
8'h (N=84) 72 .59 .00 84 96 107 119
91h (N=212) 54 .32* .09 60 67 73 80
10h (N=8) 106 -.89* .54 88 70 53 35
School-Selected
8th (N=90) 64 .32* .18 70 77 83 90
9" (N=234) 55 .34* .10 62 69 75 82
10"h (N=3) 44 .43* .99 53 61 70 78
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
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TABLE 11 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN ENGLISH 2 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-LEVEL WHEN
COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class
Performance for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores of 20 40 60 80
Zoned 8' (N=55) 66 .17 .03 69 73 76 80
9'h (N=121) 55 .26* .04 60 65 71 76
10th (N=6) 90 -. 90 .88 72 54 36 18
Randomly-Assigned
8'h (N=88) 67 .16 .02 70 73 77 80
9t (N=191) 60 .15* .02 63 66 69 72
10" (N=18) 60 .13 .01 63 65 68 70
School-Selected
8'h (N=98) 63 .33* .18 70 76 83 89
9f (N=207) 58 .28* .06 64 69 75 80
101 (N=11) 30 .87* .34 47 65 82 100
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
TABLE 11 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN ENGLISH 3 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-LEVEL WHEN
COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class
Performance for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores of 20 40 60 80
Zoned 9h (N=46) 59 .19 .04 63 67 70 74
10k (N=112) 59 .22* .03 63 68 72 77
11h (N=10) 50 .39 .07 58 66 73 81
Randomly-Assigned
9th (N=67) 73 -. 11 .01 71 69 66 64
10
th (N=162) 56 .26* .06 61 66 72 77
11th (N=14)1 55 .80 .00 71 87 103 119
School-Selected
9th (N=71) 44 .55* .19 55 66 77 88
10" (N=186) 50 .44* .15 59 68 76 85
111h (N=14) 24 .84* .38 41 58 74 91
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
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TABLE 11 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN ENGLISH 4 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-LEVEL WHEN
COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class
Performance for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores of 20 40 60 80
Zoned 9' N=40) 61 .12 .02 63 66 68 71
10 (N=102) 55 .27 .04 60 66 71 77*
Randomly-Assigned
9th (N=61) 86 -.32* .08 80 73 67 60
10t (N=152) 50 .34* .07 57 64 70 77
School-Selected
9' (N=67) 37 .61* .19 49 61 74 86
10d' (N=170) 49 .45* .16 58 67 76 85
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
TABLE 11 (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
IN ENGLISH 5 BY COHORT AND BY GRADE-LEVEL WHEN
COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class
Performance for DRP
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 Scores of 20 40 60 80
Zoned 10" (N=29) 48 .39* .12 56 64 71 79
11- (N=86) 63 .13 .01 66 68 71 73
Randomly-Assigned
10h (N=46) 63 .12 .01 65 68 70 73
11"' (N=139) 65 .13 .01 68 70 73 75
School-Selected
10th (N=50) 46 .49* .17 56 66 75 85
11' (N=132) 63 .19* .03 67 71 74 78
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to answer one the most highly debated
topics in education policy: does educational choice enhance the academic
performance of students? The results show that educational choice does
not hinder academic performance, nor does it help. Very little difference
exists between the randomly-assigned and zoned students and when there
is a difference, many times the zoned students out-performed the ran-
domly-assigned students. The key finding for policy purposes, however,
is that the school-selected students out-performed both the randomly-as-
signed and zoned students. A logical inference from this finding is that
the school administrators who selected these students used transcript in-
formation, such as attendance and middle school records, to select the
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"over-achievers." While there is no direct evidence for this proposition,
the study does show that educational choice does not produce the statisti-
cal differences in academic progress and performance between the three
cohorts.
One must observe, however, that this study only analyzed the public
school choice model discussed in Part II. Consequently, one may ques-
tion whether the results would follow a similar pattern in a private school
choice or hybrid model. Nevertheless, the study provides grounds for, at
the very least, reforming the New York City EOP.
The New York City Board of Education should eliminate school-
selection from its admission process and use only random-assignment.
Random-assignment maximizes parental empowerment in three ways.
First, random-assignment prevents schools from considering students'
prior academic record or aptitude in admission decisions. Under a ran-
dom-assignment regime, the computerized admission system never re-
ceives the students' prior academic record and, therefore, cannot
consider such data in the admissions process. The computer only consid-
ers the parents' listed prioritized schools and the physical capacity of
each school. Second, random-assignment does not provide schools with
an opportunity to discriminate against troubled youth in the admissions
process. Rejecting troubled youth contradicts the notion that parental
choice is for all parents, not those that school administrators or legisla-
tors deem worthy of empowerment. Third, random-assignment does not
confer special priority to parents living within the school district or zone
of the preferred school. Random-assignment maximizes parents' ability
to send their children to schools of choice without having to relocate
their families, because such relocation would have no effect on the ad-
missions process.
The only barrier to attaining your school of choice in a pure ran-
dom-assignment system is the weight that parents place on the applica-
tion by prioritizing one school over another. This restriction, however, is
self-imposed and reflects the parents' preference, not the preference of
school administrators. Policing-makers who design parental choice pro-
grams must take great care to prevent school administrators from inject-
ing a selection bias into the admissions process. Educational equity and
opportunity requires no less.
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APPENDIX
REGENTS DATA
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
ON THE SEQUENTIAL MATH 1 REGENTS EXAM BY COHORT
AND BY GRADE-LEVEL WHEN COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR
THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class Performance
for MAT Score of
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned 8t (N=24) 16 .66* .25 36 56 66 75 85
9* (N=31) 35 .44* .16 48 61 68 75 81
10- (N=12) 43 .47* .60 57 71 78 85 92
11-h (N=5) 22 .47 .03 36 50 57 64 71
Randomly-Assigned
8* (N=28) 19 .70* .40 40 61 72 82 93
92 (N=43) 40 .80* .27 24 48 60 72 84
10h (N=15) 43 .35 .10 54 64 69 75 80
11" (N=4) 81 -.34* .98 71 61 56 50 45
School-Selected
8' (N=55) 12 .72* .29 34 55 66 77 88
9 th (N=67) -17 1.03* .29 14 45 60 76 91
10h (N=18) 45 .36 .06 56 67 72 77 83
* Statistically Significant at p .05.
APPENDIX (Continued)
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE
ON THE SEQUENTIAL MATH 2 REGENTS EXAM BY COHORT
AND BY GRADE-LEVEL WHEN COURSE WAS TAKEN FOR
THE FIRST TIME
Estimated Class Performance
for MAT Scores of
Cohort Intercept Slope R2 30 60 75 90 105
Zoned 8* (N=7) -10 .97* .88 19 48 63 77 92
9- (N=10) 62 .15 .00 67 71 72 76 78
10- (N=19) 57 .16 .01 62 67 69 71 74
Randomly-Assigned
8* (N=3) 27 .50 .00 42 57 65 72 80
9* (N=13) -9 .96* .62 20 49 63 77 92
10h (N=21) 8 .76* .21 31 54 65 76 88
11- (N=4) -66 1.56 .64 -19 28 51 74 98
School-Selected
8* (N=5) -58 1.35 .37 -18 23 43 64 84
9* (N=31) 41 .41* .15 53 66 72 78 84
10* (N=47) -2 .89* .43 25 51 65 78 91
112 (N=10) 30 .17 .04 35 40 43 45 48
* Statistically Significant at p .05.

